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AUTOPOIESIS AND JUSTICE 
Michel Rosenfeld* 
I. JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW, JUSTICE BEYOND 
LAW, AND AUTOPOIESIS 
There is justice according to law and justice against or beyond 
law. Justice according to law is achieved when each person is treated 
in conformity with his or her legal entitlement.* Justice against law, 
on the other hand, is the justice that makes it plausible to claim that a 
law is unjust (even if it is scrupulously applied in strict compliance 
with the entitlements which the law establishes). Moreover, to be able 
to determine whether a law is just or unjust, one must rely on a crite­
rion of justice that lies beyond that law—a criterion pertaining for 
example, to ethics, religion, or a diflFerent order of law. 
The notion of a clash between justice according to law and justice 
against law dates back as far as ancient Greece where Sophocles gave 
it vivid expression in his play Antigone. As will be remembered, 
Creon, the King of Thebes, had decreed that the traitor Polynices, 
who had been killed in the field, be left unburied, his body exposed to 
the dogs and the vultures. Convinced that leaving a human body 
without burial was an offense against the gods, Antigone rebelled 
against her uncle Creon's decree and proceeded to bury her brother 
Polynices. Upon her subsequent arrest, Antigone admitted to having 
violated the King's decree, but remained unshaken in her belief that 
her action had been just. Speaking to Creon about his decree, Antig­
one declared: 
That order did not come from God. Justice, 
That dwells with the gods below, knows no such law. 
I do not think your edicts strong enough 
To overrule the unwritten unalterable laws 
Of God and heaven, you being only a man.^ 
While the clash between divine law and human law is a major 
theme in Antigone, what makes Sophocles' tragedy so poignant is 
more than the naked confrontation between divine right and human 
• Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I wish to thank my colleague 
Paul Shupack and the participants at the Legal Theory Workshop of the Faculty of Law at the 
University of Toronto for their helpful and incisive comments on an earUer draft of this article. 
• See CH. PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT 9-10 
(John Petrie trans., 1963). 
2 SOPHOCLES, Antigone, in SOPHOCLES, THE THEBAN PLAYS 138 (E.F. Watling trans., 
1985). 
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might. Indeed, notwithstanding her firm conviction that human law 
must yield to divine justice, Antigone is prepared to face the conse­
quences of having violated her duties under human law, and thus ac­
cepts that she must die for her transgression against Creon's decree.^ 
Furthermore, although Creon's insistence on being obeyed and having 
his decree enforced at all costs may betray an undue obsession with 
law and order, his close family ties to Antigone—who, besides being 
his niece, is also the intended wife of his son—make it impossible for 
him to refrain from enforcing his decree without appearing to commit 
an injustice. For how can a king's decree be just in the eyes of his 
subjects if the king's family can violate that decree with impunity?"* 
The tensions produced by the clash between human and divine 
law can be alleviated by means of a principled and systematic subordi­
nation of the positive law promulgated by human rulers to the natural 
law derived from God or reason. Moreover, the integration of posi­
tive and natural law results in the grounding of legal norms on extra­
legal values rooted in ethics or religion. Finally, the viability and 
legitimacy of a system that integrates positive and natural law de­
pends on the widespread acceptance of a set of ethical or religious 
values capable of furnishing a workable criterion of justice. 
Contemporary Western democracies tend to experience deep di­
visions concerning fundamental ethical and religious values. Conse­
quently, those democracies do not provide fertile grounds for the 
successful integration of positive and natural law. This explains the 
ascendance of legal positivism with its emphasis on the futility of 
looking to morality or religion as capable of furnishing a genuine basis 
for the legitimacy of law. Furthermore, by negating the possibility of 
divine law, legal positivism appears well-suited to defuse the tension 
between justice according to law and justice against law. Indeed, legal 
positivism invites us to lower our sights and to abandon the vain hope 
of finding any universally valid measure of justice beyond law. In­
stead, legal positivism offers us the more modest relative justice of life 
under the rule of law. 
Upon closer examination, however, legal positivism is vulnerable 
3 Id. 
* See id. at 144, where Creon says of Antigone; 
So she must die. Well may she pray to Zeus, 
The God of Family Love. How, if I tolerate 
A traitor at home, shall I rule those abroad? 
He that is a righteous master of his house 
Will be a righteous statesman. To transgress 
Or twist the law to one's own pleasure, presume 
To order where one should obey, is sinful. 
And I will have none of it. 
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to the charge that it can only resolve the clash between justice accord­
ing to law and justice against law by making it possible for law to 
completely escape the grasp of justice. Operating in societies that are 
significantly divided regarding fundamental ethical and religious 
norms, legal positivism ties the legitimacy of law to its pedigree—^a 
pedigree that seems inevitably to lead to the subjective values embod­
ied in the will of a duly recognized sovereign. Whether the legitimate 
lawmaking sovereign be an absolute monarch or a democratically 
elected legislature, the values injected into law through the expression 
of the sovereign's legislative will are bound to remain merely subjec­
tive and legitimately contestable so long as some of the monarch's 
subjects or electoral or legislative minorities adhere to conflicting val­
ues. In other words, to the extent that no subjectively held value can 
be proven inherently superior to any other, and that legal positivism 
sanctions the infusion of the subjective values of the sovereign into 
law, legal positivism tends to reduce justice according to law to a vir­
tually meaningless formality. If law must privilege certain subjective 
values over others, it is inherently unjust, and its equal application 
cannot compensate for its arbitrarily unequal impact. In short, inso­
far as it relies on the subjective preferences of the sovereign, legal pos­
itivism not only neutralizes justice against law, but also trivializes 
justice according to law.' 
Niklas Luhmann's conception of law as an autopoietic system® 
shares with legal positivism the belief that the validity of legal norms 
is not dependent on extralegal norms. In contrast to legal positivism, 
however, Luhmann's conception seems successfully to avoid reliance 
on the injection of subjective values as an indispensable component in 
5 Although in the course of the preceding observations I have referred to a crude version 
of legal positivism that reduces legitimate lawmaking to the explicit expression of the will of 
the sovereign, the validity of these observations and of the conclusions to which they lead are 
in no way confined to that particular version of positivism. Thus, for instance, the more so­
phisticated legal positivism of H.L.A. Hart seems no more immune to the charge of having to 
rely on arbitrary subjective values than its more primitive counterpart. According to Hart, the 
primary rules, or first order rules, govern behavior but are dependent on second order niles— 
the "rules of recognition"—for their validity. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97-
98 (1961). In the absence of objective values, either the second order rules are infused with 
subjective values or, if they are "purely" formal, the establishment of the requisite links be­
tween first order and second order rules through judicial lawmaking necessarily introduces 
subjective values into the process of legal validation. Thus, in Hart's sophisticated legal posi­
tivism the introduction of subjective values may be displaced but it is by no means eliminated. 
® Autopoietic systems "are systems that are defined as unities as network of productions 
of components that recursively, through their interactions, generate and realize the network 
that produces them and constitute, in the space in which they exist, the boundaries of the 
network as components that participate in the realization of the network." HUMBERTO 
MATURANA, Autopoiesis, in AUTOPOIESIS: A THEORY OF LIVING ORGANIZATION 21 (Milan 
Zeleny ed., 1981). 
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the articulation of legitimate legal norms. Law conceived as an auto-
poietic system is self-referential and produces and structures its com­
ponent elements.' Moreover, as a subsystem of the social system, 
law's elements and mode of reproduction consist of communications.® 
In other words, autopoietic law, for Luhmann, must be understood as 
a network of communications that recursively produce and reproduce 
communications;^ that is, as a system that marks identities and diflFer-
ences as a function of communications abstracted from other levels of 
reality, including the one that comprises the formation and projection 
of subjective value preferences.'® Accordingly, legal autopoiesis, as 
conceived by Luhmann, makes it apparently possible for the legal sys­
tem to remain operationally severed both from extralegal norms and 
from the imprint of arbitrary subjectivity by relying on self-referential 
circularity as the foundation of law." Consistent with this theory, 
Luhmann's legal autopoiesis may furnish the means to safeguard the 
integrity of justice according to law while at the same time making it 
safe to abandon an ultimately doomed search for justice beyond law. 
It is Luhmaim's conception of legal autonomy that renders his 
theory of autopoietic law particularly attractive from the standpoint 
of establishing a firm contemporary foundation for justice according 
to law. Luhmann's claim concerning legal autonomy, however, is 
highly controversial." According to Luhmann, the legal system is 
' See NIKLAS LUHMANN, ESSAYS ON SELF-REFERENCE 3 (1990). Luhman states that: 
Autopoietic systems . . . not only produce and eventually change their own struc­
tures-, their self-reference applies to the production of other components as well. 
This is the decisive conceptual innovation. It adds a turbocharger to the already 
powerful engine of self-referential machines .... [E]verything that is used as a unit 
by the system is produced as a unit by the system itself. This applies to elements, 
processes, boundaries, and other structures and, last but not least, to the unity of 
the system itself. 
® See id. 
9 Id. 
See id where Luhmann states that: 
Autopoietic systems ... are sovereign with respect to the constitution of identities 
and differences. They, of course, do not create a material world of their own. 
They presuppose other levels of reality, as for example human life presupposes the 
small span of temperature in which water is liquid. But whatever they use as iden­
tities and differences is of their own making. 
Id 
•' Cf. Arthur Jacobson, Autopoietic Law: The New Science of Niklas Luhmann, 87 MICH. 
L. REV. 1647, 1675 (1989) (book review) ("Luhmann's theory of society as communication 
tolerates neither values nor individuals. Values for him are what the individual desires, rather 
than what is desirable. Individuals are the desiring creatures of Hobbes' utilitarian calculus, 
rather than moral beings wrestling values into action through norms.") (citations omitted). 
12 See ATN-opoiETic LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 6 (Gunther 
Teubner ed., 1987) [hereinafter AUTOPOIETIC LAW] ("Legal autopoiesis is probably most con­
troversial in its insistence on legal autonomy."). 
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one of a series of autonomous autopoietic subsystems that make up 
the social system." Moreover, as societies become more complex, the 
number of these autopoietic subsystems increases to meet developing 
needs for greater functional differentiation." Although each of these 
subsystems is considered to be autonomous, it maintains links to the 
remaining social subsystems. Thus, law as an autonomous self-refer­
ential subsystem relates to the other social subsystems as a system 
relates to its environment. Or, said another way, from the standpoint 
of its functional operations, law is an autonomous system that has 
other social subsystems, such as the political and the economic sub­
systems, as its environment." Consistent with this, the legal system is 
not severed from contact with the realms of politics or economics. 
Nonetheless—and this is crucial—political or economic factors can­
not partake in the production and application of legal norms, because, 
in Luhmann's conception, the legd system is normatively closed 
while remaining cognitiyely open." Luhmann's insistence on norma­
tive closure is difficult to accept, however, given the widespread belief 
that political and economic values play a significant role in shaping 
legal norms. Similarly, even conceding that society's increasing com­
plexity fuels a need for greater functional differentiation, best satisfied 
through the proliferation of self-referential autopoietic subsystems, it 
is hard to imagine that the shaping and application of legal norms 
remains closed to the normative input of individual actors engaged on 
the legal scene. 
While the issue of the autonomy of autopoietic law is crucial 
from the standpoint of assessing the potential contribution of auto-
poiesis to justice according to law, this issue is not easily settled. 
Luhmann's theory of legal autopoiesis has been the subject of numer­
ous criticisms" but Luhmann has proven to be a very elusive target." 
Some of the difficulty with legal autonomy stems from the fact that 
the boundaries of law as a distinct practice may plausibly be drawn 
along a wide spectrum ranging from the very narrow to the very 
broad. Also, because of his special focus on functional differentiation. 
13 See Niklas Luhmann, Closure and Openness: On Reality in the World of Law, in AUTO­
POIETIC LAW, supra note 12, at 335-48. 
14 Id. 
1' See LUHMANN, supra note 7, at 176-78. 
16 Id. at 229. 
1' See, e.g., Hubert Rottleuthner, Biological Metaphors in Legal Thought, in AUTOPOIETIC 
LAW, supra note 12, at 97-127; Richard Lempert, The Autonomy of Law: Two Visions Com­
pared, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW, supra note 12, at 152-90; Jacobson, supra note 11. 
18 Luhmann's excellent paper presented at this conference. Operational Closure and Struc­
tural Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal System, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419 (1992) is 
typical of the great skill with which he has confronted his critics. 
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Luhmann may systematically privilege law's potential for marking 
differences over any capacity which it may have to mobilize and inte­
grate wide-ranging normative concerns. Finally, Luhmann's theory 
tackles law at such a high level of abstraction that it is hard to get a 
firm handle on the empirical implications of his claim concerning 
legal autonomy.'® 
While these difficulties cannot be eliminated, they can be largely 
circumvented by confining the inquiry to the possible connection be­
tween the kind of autonomy generated by legal autopoiesis and the 
relationship between justice and law. The important question is not 
how narrow or broad the realm of law is as a practice, but rather 
whether there is any plausible sense of legal autonomy consistent with 
Luhmann's legal autopoiesis which would provide genuine support 
for justice according to law in the absence of any normative consensus 
on justice beyond law. Moreover, once the inquiry is properly focused 
on the latter question, it should become apparent that the key to a 
satisfactory answer revolves around Luhmann's notion that law's self-
referentiality allows for a circular justification of legal norms and op­
erations. Indeed, if legal norms ultimately depend on their own circu­
larity for their justification, then justice according to law would be 
completely independent from justice beyond law while remaining im­
mune to manipulation based on the pursuit of purely subjective values 
by individual actors. 
Based on the following analysis of the relationship between law 
and justice, and of the possible nexus between law, justice, and legal 
autopoiesis, this article will conclude that law cannot achieve the kind 
of full circularity required to sustain Luhmann's conception of legal 
autopoiesis. The reason for this is that law as a (contemporary) prac­
tice cannot be fully emancipated from the normative grasp of justice 
beyond law, and, at least in part, is permeated by the extralegal norms 
that inform that kind of justice. As we shall see, the impossibility of 
reaching a consensus about any particular version of justice beyond 
law should not be misconstrued to signify that law can altogether do 
away with the kinds of extralegal norms that underlie justice beyond 
law in all its possible incarnations. On the other hand, Luhmann's 
analysis should not be quickly discounted, for it captures a particu­
larly important aspect of contemporary legal relationships. As I shall 
argue below, Luhmann perceptively and convincingly analyzes what 
is a fundamental tendency of modem legal systems toward autonomy 
and self-referentiality. Because of his reductionist vision, however, 
Luhmann ends up mistaking the part for the whole. Properly con-
" This point is emphasized by Lempert. See Lempert, supra note 17, at 187-88. 
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strued, contemporary legal systems should be understood in terms of 
a dynamic ongoing struggle between a never achieved justice against 
law and a constantly disrupted justice according to law unsuccessfully 
vying for separation and autonomy. Accordingly, neither natural 
law, nor positivism, nor Luhmann's richer and more sophisticated 
positivistic autopoietic theory can do justice to the dynamic processes 
characteristic of contemporary legal relationships. The age-old strug­
gle between justice according to law and justice against law drama­
tized in Antigone rages on, without end in sight. But more recently, 
the form of this struggle has been altered almost beyond recognition, 
as the unity of justice beyond law has itself given way to division and 
struggle, and as justice according to law has—as Luhmann's theory 
vividly illustrates—fought hard in the hope of gaining independence 
from both God and humans. 
In order to buttress these conclusions, the article attempts a phe-
nomenological retracing, first, of the breakdown of the unity of justice 
beyond law in relation to the realm of legal relationships, and then of 
law's journey towards increasing self-referentiality and autonomy. 
The article then focuses on the plausible scope and limitation of the 
role of legal autopoiesis in the context of both the reaction against the 
breakdown of unity of justice against law and the legal system's eflForts 
at greater self-referentiality and circularity, viewed as two comple­
mentary aspects of the same overall process. Finally, drawing upon 
the conclusions suggested by the preceding analysis, the article 
sketches a picture of the current struggle between justice against law 
and justice according to law and of the possible place of the tendency 
toward legal autopoiesis in the context of their struggle. 
II. LAW AND THE BREAKDOWN OF THE UNITY OF JUSTICE 
BEYOND LAW 
The concept of justice can be said to revolve around two distinct 
unities: the unity among the subjects who may claim entitlement to 
justice—to which we may refer as "horizontal unity"—and the unity 
among the different normative levels at which justice may be pre­
scribed, including the religious, moral, political, and legal levels—to 
which we may refer as "vertical unity." One may further postulate 
that perfect justice occurs where there is both full horizontal and ver­
tical unity. Moreover, in a state of perfect justice, justice is not likely 
to be an issue on anyone's mind, as there would be no interpersonal 
disputes or discrepancies among different normative levels. 
The question of justice and the call for justice only arise in the 
face of some breakdown, at least in horizontal unity. Indeed, even if 
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vertical unity remains intact, one person could shatter horizontal 
unity by infringing upon another's entitlement. So long as only hori­
zontal unity is breached, infringements of entitlement will give rise to 
calls for corrective or compensatory justice.On the other hand, if 
vertical unity is also broken—either because conflicting criteria of jus­
tice are suggested for different normative levels or because such clash­
ing criteria are sought to be applied to the same normative level— 
then questions of distributive justice^' as well as of compensatory jus­
tice are likely to be raised. Questions of distributive justice are most 
obviously implicated when a breakdown of vertical unity is reflected 
at a single normative level. In that case, members of society clash 
over which, among competing criteria of distribution, ought to be 
used for purposes of allocating that society's benefits and burdens. 
Moreover, although perhaps less obvious, questions of distributive 
justice can also arise when the split in vertical unity cuts across differ­
ent normative levels. Thus, for instance, distributive justice is at issue 
when acting in accordance with moral norms would lead to a different 
allocation of benefits and burdens than that which would result from 
the application of legal norms.^^ 
Based on the contemplation of situations where no breach of ver­
tical unity accompanies a departure from horizontal unity, it might be 
erroneously concluded that corrective justice can operate indepen­
dently from distributive justice. Actually, any genuine measure of 
just compensation is parasitic on some norm of just distribution. For 
20 Compensatory justice "requires the transfer of goods from one subject to another in 
order to restore the equilibrium that existed between these two subjects prior to their volun­
tary or involuntary involvement in a transaction that resulted in a gain for the violator and a 
loss for the victim." MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE: A PHILO­
SOPHICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 32 (1991). 
21 Distributive justice, understood broadly, refers to the equitable allocation of the benefits 
and burdens produced by, or subject to the control of, a society among its members, according 
to some normative criterion of distribution. 
22 In some cases, a break in vertical unity may be viewed either as raising questions of 
distribution or questions of compensation, depending on the perspective from which the rele­
vant break in vertical umty is apprehended. Returning to Antigone for purposes of illustration, 
the confrontation that pits Creon against Antigone is essentially one between the dictates of 
religious or ethical norms and those of legal norms. From the standpoint of Antigone, the 
confrontation concerns the allocation of benefits and burdens—or more precisely of entitle­
ments and obligations—regarding the disposition of Polynices' mortal remains. From Creon's 
standpoint, however, the confrontation centers around Antigone's violation of legitimate legal 
norms, thus primarily raising questions of corrective justice—in the sense of symbolically eras­
ing Antigone's encroachment upon the body politic. See Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstruction 
and Legal Interpretation: Conflict, Indeterminacy and the Temptations of the New Legal For­
malism, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1211, 1249 (1990) ("Corrective justice promotes the minimal 
harmony of mutual non-interference through the spread of a quantitative equality that ritualis-
tically effaces the encroachment of a wrongdoing self upon a suffering other."). 
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example, it is impossible to determine whether the proper measure of 
damages in a breach of contract case involving the breaching party's 
refusal to pay for goods received pursuant to the contract should be 
the agreed upon contract price, the market price for the goods in­
volved, or some other price generally deemed to be "just," without 
relying on some conception of distributive justice." However, as in 
the case of perfect justice, there may be no awareness of justice as no 
one experiences a need to call for justice, where corrective justice is at 
stake in the context of unbroken vertical unity, the uncontroverted 
operation of distributive norms may well remain beyond the grasp of 
those concentrating on the pursuit of compensatory aims. 
Law, like justice, can be viewed as becoming a matter of concern 
upon the dissolution of some mythic perfect unity. Modem legal sys­
tems, moreover, are the product of division among social groups and 
of conflicts that aUenate the individual from the group. As Roberto 
Unger points out, modem legal systems prevalent in Westem democ­
racies are characterized by, among other things, group pluralism" 
and general mles of law that are imiversally applicable to all, regard­
less of status or group affUiation,^' while prescribing duties and enti­
tlements to individuals." Furthermore, in Westem democracies, the 
function of adjudication tends to be sharply separated from that of 
legislation," with a view towards shielding the judicial resolution of 
legal disputes from the politics that inevitably surround the legislative 
process. 
The advent of the market, which, as Max Weber has stated, is "a 
relationship which transcends the boundaries of neighborhood, kin­
ship group, or tribe,"^® provides the tuming point towards the greater 
differentiation characteristic of modem legal systems. As recounted 
by Weber, economic scarcity prompted individuals to leave their own 
communities in order to exchange goods with strangers at market. In 
dealing with such strangers, however, individuals could not rely on 
the kinship mles that govemed relationships within their own com­
munity, and therefore had to look to universally applicable laws capa­
ble of transcending the local biases of intracommunal norms." In 
23 For a more extended discussion of the necessary link between corrective and distributive 
criteria in the context of a breach of contract, see id. at 1255 n.l34. 
24 See ROBERT UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 66 (1976) 
25 See id. at 69. 
26 See id. at 83, 86. 
22 See, e.g., U.S. CONST, arts. I and III, providing for separation between the legislative 
and judiciary powers of the United States. 
28 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 637 (Gunther Roth & Clause Wittish eds., 
1968). 
29 See id.; see also Richard Miinch, Differentiation, Rationalization, Interpretation: The 
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other words, interactions in noncommunal spheres between strangers 
with different ethical and religious values require clearly differentiated 
laws that scrupulously avoid taking sides with respect to parochial 
issues or intruding upon intracommunal matters. This is paramount 
in order to alleviate the misgivings and reduce the uncertainties con­
fronting those who must leave home and deal with strangers wilhng 
to trade on the market. 
Given the twin aims of avoiding favoritism toward any particular 
parochial values and of fostering regularity and settled expectations 
regarding dealings in noncommunal spheres, procedural rules loom as 
especially apt vehicles for the institution of a highly differentiated set 
of laws designed to mediate interactions among strangers. Moreover, 
at least in the case of the laissez-faire economic market, reliance on 
process oriented-formal or procedural laws not only promotes greater 
certainty in noncommunal dealings without trampling on substantive 
communal values, but also makes it possible to directly serve the aims 
of the market by codifying the rules of market competition. To the 
extent that lawful competition insures that market transactions collec­
tively will promote the common good, the procedural laws that carve 
out the nature and scope of such competition at once foster substan­
tive values in the noncommunal spheres while leaving intact preexist­
ing substantive values operative in particular communal spheres.^" 
It is important for laws designed to provide procedures for 
noncommimal relationships to be differentiated from, and to avoid the 
appearance of depending on, communal norms. Accordingly, the for­
mal, process-oriented and heavily procedural laws designed to facili­
tate noncommunal exchanges must project an image of detachment 
from ethical and religious values—an image that can be promoted 
through spreading of the belief that law itself can become completely 
independent from religion and ethics. Moreover, accompanying and 
reinforcing this image and the belief that sustains it is, of course, the 
Emergence of Modern Society, in DIFFERENTIATION THEORY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 441,448-
49 (Jeffrey Alexander et al eds., 1990) (The "emergence of interactions with strangers outside 
the community . . . leads to the differentiation of noncommunal spheres of interaction from 
communal interaction" and requires "new forms of interactions that are not covered by the 
internal regulations of the community."). 
30 Consistent with the economic views of Adam Smith, the morals of the market contrast 
with the morals of other spheres. In the market, individuals are obligated to act out of self-
love rather than altruism, as the invisible hand of the process of competition automatically 
leads those who act out of self-love (but not necessarily those who act out of altruism) to 
contribute to the common good. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND 
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 477-78 (Edwin Canaan ed., 1976). For a more ex­
tended discussion of the relationship between the morals of the market and the morals of other 
spheres, see Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation between Classical Contract 
Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 875-77 (1985). 
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perception—^buttressed by the sharp contrast between communal and 
noncommunal dealings—of a breakdown of vertical unity in the realm 
of justice, with justice according to law bearing little or no connection 
to justice beyond law. Thus, as communal deahngs increasingly give 
way to noncommunal dealings among strangers, from the standpoint 
of justice, both horizontal and vertical unity enter into a process of 
dissolution that seems headed towards a complete breakdown. 
As it appears to become increasingly independent from other 
levels of justice, legal justice, while retaining compensatory and dis­
tributive components, tends to be concerned primarily with proce­
dural matters. Procedural justice, like its distributive and 
compensatory counterparts, is a necessary but inconspicuous compo­
nent of perfect justice. A call to justice, moreover, may concentrate 
exclusively on procedural justice even in the face of complete har­
mony regarding applicable criteria of compensatory and distributive 
justice. Thus, for instance, a dispute could arise on the subject of the 
best available procedure needed to implement an agreed upon crite­
rion of compensatory justice. What is markedly different about con­
temporary legal justice, however, is its tendency to concentrate 
exclusively on procedural justice to the exclusion of the other forms of 
justice. 
To better understand how procedural justice may acquire inde­
pendence, it is useful to refer to the distinction made by John Rawls 
between the two different types of procedures that might lead to the 
achievement of justice. The first requires both an independent crite­
rion of justice to determine what would constitute a just compensa­
tion or distribution and a procedure to lead to the desired outcome as 
prescribed by the independent criterion. If the procedure guarantees 
the desired outcome then we have, in Rawl's terms "perfect proce­
dural justice'V if it does not, then we have "imperfect procedural 
justice."^^ On the other hand, the second type of procedure, "pure 
procedural justice," does not require an independent criterion of (dis­
tributive or compensatory) justice for its validity. In this context, 
the outcome is supposed to be just, provided only that the relevant 
procedure was properly followed.^'^ 
Modem law's greater concem with questions of procedure is 
most probably, in part, due to the fact that strangers tend to be suspi-
31 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 85 (1971). 
32 Id. As an example of imperfect procedural justice, Rawls mentions the criminal trial 
under the adversary system of justice. See id. 
33 Id. at 86. 
3A Id. Rawls suggests that gambling provides an example of pure procedural justice. Id. 
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cious of one another. As noncommunal dealings occur in settings 
without estabhshed customs and traditions governing interactions, 
matters of procedure seem bound to leap to the forefront. More im­
portantly, however, the independent law applicable to noncommunal 
spheres, which is cut oflF from the ethical and religious norms opera­
tive in communal spheres, seems left with no more desirable path to 
justice than that of pure procedural justice. Indeed, where the adop­
tion of any substantive criterion of justice would smack of parochial­
ism, the pursuit of pure procedural justice looms as the best possible 
alternative. 
To the extent that free market competition guarantees achieve­
ment of the common good, implementation of the laws needed to sus­
tain the free market would produce pure procedural justice. 
Moreover, among the most important of these laws would be laws 
regarding contract formation designed to maximize freedom of con­
tract.^' Thus, assuming the existence of such laws, justice would re­
quire the enforcement of freely entered into contracts not because of 
the nature of the contractual terms involved, but because of the fact 
that the contractors had freely availed themselves of the rules of con­
tract formation and freely agreed upon the terms of their mutual con­
tractual obligations.'® 
In sum, under optimal conditions and in the presence of a free 
market model of noncommunal relationships, law acquires indepen­
dence from other normative spheres, and its implementation is capa­
ble of producing pure procedural justice. Under these circumstances, 
moreover, justice beyond law has most likely become fragmented and 
largely cast away to a distant horizon. Justice according to law can 
then claim both independence and self-sufficiency inasmuch as it gen­
erates pure procedural justice. 
As the market tends to become all-encompassing and local com­
munities recede towards the vanishing point, justice according to law 
tends to dwarf justice against law and pure procedural justice be­
comes increasingly sweeping. At the logical culmination of this pro­
cess, it would appear that law would achieve complete independence 
and that justice according to law relying on pure procedural justice 
would occupy the entire domain of justice, rendering justice beyond 
law completely superfluous. In reality, however, this state of affairs is 
impossible to realize for at least two principal reasons. First, the ex-
35 Cf. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 561, 625 (1983) ("A regime of contract is just another legal name for a market."). 
36 For a more extended discussion of the possible relation between freedom of contract and 
pure procedural justice, see Rosenfeld, supra note 30, at 792-93, 804-05. 
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pulsion of ethical and religious values from the market is only possible 
so long as these values can find an outlet for expression in local com­
munities that remain beyond the reach of the market. Thus, while 
economic exchanges take place among strangers, religious and ethical 
activities can remain largely confined to local communities among 
one's family and kinship groups. Relationships among strangers can 
be sustained to the extent that they are complemented by strong com­
munal bonds. If local communities were to give complete way to 
market relationships, however, then all intersubjective relationships 
would be among strangers, and individuals would risk losing all sense 
of identity unless they could find a way to forge ethical or religious 
bonds with the strangers they encounter on the market. In short, 
either ethical and religious concerns are confined to communal 
spheres that remain beyond the market or they are bound to irrupt on 
the market for lack of any other available outlet.^' 
The second principal reason why justice according to law can 
never come to occupy the entire domain of justice is that market com­
petition is never perfect, and, even if perfect competition could be 
achieved in the economic sense, the market would still automatically 
fail to promote a universally acceptable conception of the common 
good. Moreover, to the extent that unfettered economic competition 
must be curbed for the common good or public welfare, one must 
look beyond the market and justice according to law to find legal 
norms that will prove just and efficacious. So long as the public wel­
fare is perceived as requiring that market relationships be curbed 
rather than eliminated, justice according to law and pure procedural 
justice are certain to retain legitimacy within a part of the domain 
encompassed by justice. The remainder of that domain, however, will 
call for justice beyond law (and laws embodying norms derived from 
the latter kind of justice). For example, let us assume that unlimited 
freedom of contract is deemed unjust insofar as it fosters exploitation 
of the weak by the powerful, but that the limitation of freedom of 
contract through the implementation of minimum wage and maxi­
mum work hours legislation would suffice to prevent exploitation in 
labor relations. Under these circumstances, a labor contract would be 
just, in part because its terms satisfied the minimum wage, maximum 
hours laws, and beyond that, because of the fact that the contractors 
freely and mutually agreed to enter into it. Furthermore, the mini-
37 Cf. GEORG HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 148 (T. Knox trans., 1967) ("[C]ivil society 
tears the individual from his family ties, estranges the members of the family from one another, 
and recognizes them as self-subsistent persons .... Thus the individual becomes a son of civil 
society which has as many claims upon him as he has rights against it."). 
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mum-wage/maximum-hours laws would not be just in themselves, 
but only in reference to some expression of justice beyond law which 
would itself have to be legitimated in terms of adherence to certain 
extralegal norms; for example, it is unethical or contrary to religious 
dogma to exploit human beings. Inasmuch as the labor contract is 
just because of the fact of agreement, there is room left for pure proce­
dural justice. But since the determination of how much room ought to 
be left for pure procedural justice requires recourse to justice beyond 
law, in the last analysis the legitimacy of pure procedural justice also 
depends on extralegal norms. 
There is no fixed point at which communal concerns spill over 
into an expanding market sphere, nor is there a clear line dividing 
what ought to be left to the free market from what should be placed 
beyond its reach. There is also no set prescription concerning how the 
emerging community of strangers might find a suitable equilibrium 
between seeking to transform market relationships from within and 
attempting to circumscribe them through confrontation with 
nonmarket norms. All those issues are the subject of an ongoing, dy­
namic process which involves confrontation as well as accommoda­
tion, and which is therefore likely to produce numerous boundary 
shifts. One thing, however, does remain constant throughout the un­
folding of this process: the presence of justice beyond law. Although 
it has become prey to fragmentation and to seemingly irresolvable in­
ternal clashes, justice beyond law is either present implicitly or it is 
present as the antagonist from whom justice according to law seeks, 
but ultimately fails, to wrest an independent existence. 
The fragmentation of justice beyond law makes for extralegal 
norms that are highly contestable and that thus lend only the most 
precarious support to the laws which they purport to justify. One 
way to strengthen that support and to seemingly reverse the process 
of fragmentation is for justice beyond law explicitly to embrace plu-
rahsm as the paramount extralegal norm. In other words, instead of 
abandoning the sphere of justice beyond law to a hopeless contest 
among antagonistic extralegal norms, one may adopt pluralism as the 
best means to introduce unity in the shaping of legal norms without 
sacrificing the diversity generated by the coexistence of antagonistic 
norms. 
Commitment to pluralism also leads to formalism and 
proceduralism, although not necessarily for the same reasons as does 
a devotion to market competition. From the standpoint of a pluralis­
tic philosophy, diversity and tolerance of different normative outlooks 
are fundamental values. Pluralism recognizes the importance of jus-
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tice beyond law, but insists on maintaining a clear divide between it 
and justice according to law, in an effort to avoid privileging some sets 
of competing extralegal norms over others. Accordingly, the formal­
ism and proceduralism sought by pluralism are not meant to weaken 
or eliminate justice beyond law, but instead to infuse law with a mea­
sure of neutrality sufficient to permit a peaceful coexistence between 
diverse conceptions of justice beyond law. In short, pluralism seeks to 
maintain the differentiation of law from extralegal norms, in order to 
insure as much as possible that law will not stand in the way of the 
pursuit of different conceptions of justice beyond law and of the com­
mon good. Although pluralism may be capable of encompassing sev­
eral different conceptions of justice beyond law, it ultimately fails to 
promote a legal system that is genuinely neutral with respect to all 
extralegal norms. Indeed, to avert self-contradiction and self-destruc­
tion, pluralism can only protect those sets of extralegal norms that 
can peacefully coexist with competing norms.^® Because of this, plu­
ralism must sacrifice neutrality and resort to privileging mutually 
compatible norms over incompatible ones.^' In the end, pluralism it­
self must be counted as a substantive value that informs a particular 
conception of justice beyond law. Pluralism is unique because it re­
quires sustaining the divide between justice according to law and jus­
tice beyond law as part of its strategy towards the realization of its 
own conception of justice beyond law. And thus, neither pluralism, 
nor formalism, nor proceduralism invoked in response to the break­
down of the unity of justice beyond law seems capable of eliminating 
the nexus between law and extralegal norms, or fully liberating justice 
according to law from its moorings in justice beyond law. 
III. LEGAL AUTOPOIESIS, THE BREAKDOWN OF JUSTICE 
BEYOND LAW, AND THE TURN TOWARDS SELF-
REFERENTIAL CLOSURE 
As already briefly noted, the cornerstones of legal autopoiesis are 
38 For example, religious diversity is only possible so long as the adherents to one religion 
are prepared to tolerate the expression of other religious beliefs and practices. Crusading reli­
gions that preach forced conversions and intolerance of the infidel could accordingly only be 
tolerated by pluraUsts at the risk of undermining religious diversity. At the very least, the 
protection of religious pluralism offers a more favorable environment for non-crusading reli­
gious than for their crusading counterparts. For a more extended discussion of the paradox 
produced as a consequence of toleration of the intolerant, see Michel Rosenfeld, Extremist 
Speech and the Paradox of Tolerance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (1987) (book review). 
39 Cf. UNGER, supra note 24, at 129 ("[T]he conditions of liberal society require that the 
legal order be seen as somehow neutral or capable of accommodating antagonistic interests 
.... Yet every choice among different interpretations of the rules, different laws, or different 
procedures for lawmaking necessarily sacrifices some interests to others."). 
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a conception of law, in particular, and society, in general, as networks 
of communication; the existence of a degree of social complexity that 
calls for a high level of functional diflFerentiation; the generation of 
conflict as a means to the creation and application of legal norms; self-
referentiality and circularity; the legal (sub)system's normative clo­
sure combined with its cognitive openness towards other spheres of 
social interaction construed as the legal system's environment; and 
the independence of the legal system as a self-referential network of 
(legal) communications from the intentions of the persons who engage 
in legal discourse. 
As Gunther Teubner emphasizes, legal systems are not bom 
autopoietic; they can evolve towards greater self-referentiality and 
thus become autopoietic.'*® Moreover, the crucial moment in the 
evolution from an allopoietic to an autopoietic legal system is the 
"central shift from 'extemal' societal mechanisms of evolution to 'in­
ternal' legal mechanisms ... in the sense that extemal mechanisms 
can only have a 'modulating' effect on legal developments while the 
evolutionary primacy passes over to internal structural determina­
tion."*^ On the other hand, as Luhmann makes clear, the principal 
task of law is to stabilize expectations.'*^ Now, in the context of a 
fully normatively integrated community where the vertical unity of 
justice remains intact, the stability of expectations would seem clearly 
better served by an allopoietic legal system firmly anchored on well-
estabhshed and largely uncontroverted extralegal norms. In the face 
of a breakdown of justice beyond law, however, the contest among 
extralegal norms is bound to have a destabilizing effect, and accord­
ingly law may be better poised to buttress settled expectations by 
turning "inward" and drawing upon its own processes and elements. 
The combination of the dissolution of the vertical unity of justice 
and the increasing need to deal with strangers in noncommimal set­
tings creates a strong need for an autonomous legal system. On the 
one hand, the lack of vertical unity of justice makes it impossible con­
vincingly or authoritatively to reconcile law with any available extra­
legal norms. On the other hand, because interacting strangers lack 
commonly shared extralegal norms, it is imperative that they adopt 
some means of regulation which can stand independently from ex­
isting extralegal norms. Moreover, this means of regulation must gen-
^ See Gunther Teubner, Evolution of Autopoietic Law, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW, supra note 
12, at 217-41. 
Id. at 232. 
••2 See Niklas Luhmann, The Unity of the Legal System, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW, supra note 
12, at 27. 
1992] A UTOPOIESIS AND JUSTICE 1697 
erate, in the context of noncommunal relationships, the kind of 
stability of expectations that is customary in normatively integrated 
communities. 
Even if the sphere of noncommunal interaction cannot be stabi-
hzed through recourse to ethical or religious norms, it does not logi­
cally follow that an autonomous legal system offers the only plausible 
avenue to the stabilization of expectations. Arguably, the sphere of 
noncommunal interaction could also be stabilized through a process 
of political accommodation that avoided reliance on contested ethical 
or religious norms. Both autonomous legal and pohtical systems 
would bring increased stability to noncommunal spheres through the 
deployment of a communicative process. The political system, as un­
derstood here, would involve the accommodation of conflicting inter­
ests through series of ad hoc compromises among contending groups 
vying for power and influence in order to be in a better position to 
promote their own interests. Moreover, although political com­
promises would themselves be ad hoc, the political process in which 
they would be embedded could well unfold within a stable political 
structure—such as, for example, a parliamentary democracy—capa­
ble of lending firm support to important normative expectations. 
For purposes of the present discussion, the principal difference 
between a legal and a political resolution of a conflict lies in that legal 
resolutions do not consist of ad hoc compromises, but rather of deter­
minations involving the application of previously established (legal) 
normative rules, principles, or standards.^^ In spite of this difference, 
however, the legal and political systems could be viewed as working in 
harmony, with law—^perhaps in the form of a constitution—framing 
the structure of the political. At the same time, law could also be 
interpreted as complementing the ad hoc compromises of politics with 
the resolution of conflicts pursuant to previously set legal rules, stan­
dards or principles. Moreover, in view of the apparent complemen­
tarity of law and politics in this universe marked by the breakdown of 
the vertical unity of justice, it would seem that the fusion of law and 
politics rather than their uncoupling (with a view to establishing two 
To the extent that legal rules are indeterminate or that, as in the case of the common 
law, legal principles emerge piecemeal as a consequence of the judicial disposition of individual 
controversies, it may be argued that the legal system can also be characterized as involving 
many ad hoc determinations. Nevertheless, as the common law relies on legal precedent, and 
as even novel interpretations of indeterminate laws must necessarily refer to previously set 
legal norms, all legal determinations can be interpreted as being communicatively structured as 
necessarily relating to some previously established legal rule, standard or principle. For a 
further elaboration of the distinction between law and politics discussed here, see Rosenfeld, 
supra note 22, at 12S9-63. 
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autonomous social spheres) would be most likely to lead to a greater 
stabilization of expectations. 
From the standpoint of autopoietic theory, however, the stabili­
zation of expectations in a complex society with interweaving commu­
nal and noncommunal spheres of interaction might be best achieved 
through a process of increasing functional differentiation that requires 
uncoupling the legal (sub)system from the political (sub)system. In 
the context of noncommunal dealings among strangers legal interac­
tion would promote greater stabilization of expectations than would 
political interaction, to the extent that the former would have less of 
an "ad hoc" nature than the latter. In other words, if people could 
predict their legitimate legal expectations with a higher degree of 
probability than their legitimate political expectations, then the opera­
tion of the two spheres as separate and independent from one another 
might well lead to greater overall stabilization of expectations than if 
both spheres operated in a closely integrated manner.'" 
Within the framework of an autopoietic conception of social sys­
tems, the autonomous legal subsystem would be distinguished from its 
political counterpart by its mode of functioning.^' Each of these sub­
systems would provide a different mode of structuring communicative 
interaction between social actors. Moreover, although legal commu­
nication could always remain distinct and independent from political 
communication, the proportion of social conflicts submitted to the 
legal subsystem for resolution in relation to those submitted to the 
political subsystem would fluctuate depending on the circumstances.'" 
Many different considerations may enter into the determination of 
whether a particular conflict should be dealt with in the political or 
the legal arena. As already mentioned, the legal system seems gener­
ally better suited than the political system to stabilize expectations to 
the extent that it lacks the ad hoc character of its political counter­
part. In one important respect, however, this may not be the case. If 
the political forces are so skewed that one faction can dictate the 
terms of ad hoc conflict resolutions at will, then expectations may 
well be less likely to be disappointed in the political arena than in the 
It is conceivable, if the uncoupling of the legal system from the political system were to 
result in a much expanded political domain and a much shrunken legal domain, that sharp 
differentiation between the two domains would not lead to greater stabilization of expectations. 
There seems to be no reason, however, for the assumption that such an uncoupling would 
result in dramatic shifts in the relative sizes of the domains involved. 
See Luhmann, supra note 13, at 340-47. 
^ This seems to follow from Luhmann's assertion that each social subsystem treats all 
other such subsystems as its environment and from his conception of the legal system as being 
normatively closed but cognitively open. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
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legal one. Moreover, even if the faction in question is powerful 
enough to impose laws at will, that faction would still be better oflF in 
the political arena to the extent that laws are sometimes susceptible of 
acquiring enough of a meaning of their own that they escape from the 
full grasp of their proponents.'*' Consistent with these observations, 
submitting conflicts to an autonomous legal system rather than to the 
political sphere evinces a retreat from purely power-based relation­
ships in the hope of achieving more stable expectations. In the con­
text of a complete differentiation between the legal and political 
spheres, the commitment of a class of conflicts to the self-contained 
normatively closed realm of law presumably signifies both a deferral 
and an equalization of power among the parties to the relevant con­
flicts. Power is deferred inasmuch as the would-be winner of a pres­
ent poUtical resolution of an ongoing conflict submits to a previously 
established legal norm that leads to an anticipated but less favorable 
outcome of the conflict in question.^® On the other hand, power is 
relatively equalized to the extent that a rational decision to commit a 
certain Wnd of conflict for resolution within the legal sphere implies a 
willing loss of power by the strongest members of society coupled 
with some gain in power for its weakest members. Indeed, from the 
standpoint of society's strongest members, a change of venue from the 
political to the legal arena may be desirable even if it entails a loss in 
power, provided the loss is deemed outweighed by the increase in sta­
bility and security which recourse to the legal system would produce. 
Conversely, from the perspective of society's weakest members, it 
would make little sense to pursue greater stability unless that would 
increase (or at the very least not decrease) their power.*' Ultimately, 
It may be objected that the absolute ruler can fare as well in both the legal and the 
political arena since he or she can simply repeal any law before any appUcation of the law 
places an unwanted constraint on him or her. In reply, one can point out that the unchecked 
use of repeated repeals of law at will results in ad hoc resolutions of legal conflicts which would 
be virtu^y indistinguishable from the ad hoc resolutions of political conflicts. Furthermore, 
government by decree issuing from an absolute ruler would not satisfy the conditions of a 
modem legal system. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. 
Under these circumstances, power is deferred rather than simply lost to the extent that 
the party who has been a relative loser by having to settle in the legal rather than the political 
arena may have enough political clout to influence changes in legislation that are calculated to 
make him or her fare better in future legal conflicts. 
Gaining security concerning further erosions of power—as modest as that may be—does 
represent some gain of power over one's future destiny. On the other hand, there would be no 
rational incentive for society's worst off simply to seek to lock in that status for the sake of 
living under conditions of greater certainty. Furthermore, it is important to stress that these 
calculations concerning probable increases or decreases in power as a consequence of turning 
to the legal system must take place ex ante and not ex post facto. Given the vicissitudes of 
political conflict, it is possible that over time some of the weakest actors on the political scene 
might gain considerable power. That, however, is irrelevant for present purp>oses. What is 
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the equalization of power stemming from a rational agreement to re­
fer certain conflicts to an autonomous legal system may not be very 
different from the kind of equalization that would be achieved 
through a Hobbesian social contract.'" There is, however, one key 
difference between a Hobbesian agreement and submission to an au­
tonomous autopoietic legal system. In the latter case, the very media­
tion provided by the autonomous legal system would insure against 
direct subordination to the will of any individual or group vested with 
the powers of the sovereign. 
Based on the preceding analysis, the kind of justice according to 
law that could be secured through an autopoietic legal system would 
include not only a corrective component but also a distributive com­
ponent." This distributive component emerges from the sharp differ­
entiation implanted by autopoietic law and must be assessed in terms 
of the two distinct fundamental contrasts sustained by the unfolding 
of legal autopoiesis. The first of those contrasts is that between order 
and disorder (in Hobbesian terms, between civil society and the war 
of all against all characteristic of the state of nature); the second is 
that between the legal and the poUtical spheres as autonomous auto­
poietic subsystems. 
The order of autopoietic law must be contrasted to the disorder 
of unregulated noncommunal social interaction. By producing or­
der—^any order—autopoietic law differentiates itself from the poten­
tial chaos of unregulated noncommunal dealings, and insures a 
significant measure of stability in deahngs between strangers. Fur­
thermore, the presence of such stability results in a distribution of 
benefits and burdens that is arguably far preferable to, and more just 
than, that which would emanate from chaos. Accordingly, the order 
established through the process of differentiation set in motion by 
autopoietic law secures, at the very least, what may be referred to as 
"minimal distributive justice." 
crucial is the probabilities of increasing or decreasing power through political as opposed to 
legal action, as measured ex ante—that is, prior to a particular choice between politics and 
law. 
5° According to Hobbes, in exchange for securing a right to life, the parties to the social 
contract would be willing to relinquish all their other rights to an absolute monarch. See 
Thomas Hobbes, The Citizen Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, in 
MAN AND CITIZEN 190, 234 (Bernard Gert ed., 1972). 
'1 The normative closure of the legal system insures the availability of corrective justice as 
a necessary means to continued stabilization of normative expectations. In the face of inevita­
ble disappointments of legitimate expectations through the transgression of legal norms, the 
continued stability of normative expectations depends on the availability of compensatory rem­
edies. Moreover, to the extent that an autopoietic legal system internally generates the means 
necessary to dispense compensatory justice, it is also bound to produce some form of proce­
dural justice. 
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Insofar as the process of differentiation that sustains the legal 
sphere's autonomy from the pohtical sphere produces greater stability 
of expectations, it too contributes to the establishment of minimal dis­
tributive justice. Beyond that, moreover, as discussed above, the pro­
cess that functionally differentiates an autopoietical legal system from 
its pohtical counterpart tends to lead to the production of greater 
equalization (of power) in the legal sphere than in the political one; 
that is, assuming that the same conflict would be equally amenable to 
either legal or pohtical resolution, then its legal resolution would most 
likely take place in the context of a smaher disparity of power among 
the parties to the conflict than would its pohtical resolution. Consis­
tent with this difference in disparity of power, commitment of a con­
flict to an autonomous legal rather than pohtical system would result 
in a relatively more equitable allocation of relevant benefits and biu*-
dens.®^ Hence, in addition to producing minimal distributive justice, 
legal autopoiesis further promotes distributive justice through an, al­
beit relative and modest, equalization of benefits and burdens among 
strangers engaged in noncommunal exchanges. 
While ah legal systems presumably satisfy minimal distributive 
justice, autopoietic legal systems are supposed to do more. Indeed, 
legal autopoiesis is not only poised to wrest order out of disorder but 
also to furnish some kind of insurance through the use of normative 
closure to stabihze expectations of expectations.'^ To reduce com­
plexity, social actors seek to achieve greater certainty concerning their 
expectations, and especially concerning their expectations of the ex­
pectations of others. The greater the certainty that a social actor has 
concerning the expectations of all concerned, the more insurance that 
actor has concerning the consequences of his or her dealings with 
others. Particularly when dealing with strangers in noncommunal 
settings, however, cognitive expectations are subject to constant revi­
sion, as they are likely to be frequently disappointed due to error or 
miscalculations.'^ In contrast, normative expectations can be stabi-
Uzed counterfactually, with the consequence that they need not be 
It is important to stress the relative nature of the equalization attributable to legal auto­
poiesis. It is of course possible to have very egalitarian political norms and highly inegalitarian 
legal norms. All that is claimed here is that relative to the actual political system that 
launched the legislation implemented by a particular legal system and functionally constituted 
as part of the actual social environment of that legal system, a legal resolution of a conflict 
would tend to be more egalitarian than a contemporaneous political resolution of the same 
conflict. 
53 SEE NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW 31-40 (Martin Albrow ed., 
Elizabeth King & Martin Albrow trans., 1985); LUHMANN, supra note 7, at 14-15, 232-33. 
5^ See Luhmann, supra note 42, at 19-20. 
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revised even if they are disappointed.'' 
For example, if I happen to expect all my business appointments 
to be punctual, and they frequently happen to arrive late, I would be 
better oflF by revising my (cognitive) expectation in order to minimize 
the aggravation I experience as a result of counting on punctuality. 
On the other hand, if the law provides that those who buy goods must 
pay for them, I need not revise my (normative) expectation that my 
customers should pay for the goods they buy, even if many of them 
fail to pay. So long as the law remains in force, I am entitled to hold 
on to my normative expectation. Moreover, to the extent that the law 
provides remedies for the disappointment of legitimate normative ex­
pectations, it provides insurance to legal actors.'® Finally, although 
this is not logically required, the stabilization of normative expecta­
tions through law is also likely to lead to a significant decrease in the 
fluctuation of cognitive expectations. Indeed, it seems reasonable to 
expect that in the long run a vast majority of people will tend to be­
have in conformity with their legal obligations.'"' 
In the context of dealings among strangers, the kind of insurance 
that autopoietic law can provide in a complex, functionally differenti­
ated society amounts to a benefit that enhances the distributive justice 
that may be dispensed through justice according to (autopoietic) law. 
Furthermore, by adding this latter enhancement to the minimal dis­
tributive justice and the relative equalization discussed previously, we 
get a fair picture of the kind of distributive justice that is implicit in 
justice according to (autopoietic) law. This distributive justice is 
purely procedural in the sense that (in light of the presumed break­
down and fragmentation of justice beyond law) it does not matter 
what the substantive content of valid legal norms may be so long as 
these norms are regularly applied and capable of marking the distinc­
tion between what should count as legal and what should be deemed 
illegal. In the last analysis, the modest measure of distributive justice 
compatible with autopoietic law seems to rest on two principal as­
sumptions: a normative vacuum or hopeless struggle relating to jus­
tice beyond law, and the vindication of the claim of normative closure 
in the realm of legal communications. 
55 Id. 
55 I may be uncertain that my customers will pay me, but if the law provides for damages 
in case of nonpayment, I will, in most cases, be assured of payment for the goods I sell. 
5'' If, for example, I am fairly certain that failure to honor my contractual obligations will 
result in liability to pay damages, I am not likely to have any reasonable incentive to break my 
contracts. My expectation would therefore most likely be to honor my contracts, and my 
actual and potential fellow contractors would have grounds to be relatively secure in their 
(cognitive) expectations of my expectation. 
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As to the first of these two assumptions, it is important to note 
that autopoietic law does not merely come to occupy an existing vac­
uum brought about by the retreat of justice beyond law, but it also 
constantly endeavors to actively maintain and even expand this vac­
uum through the proliferation of its self-enclosed and self-referential 
processes. Autopoietic law not only offers a means to resolve existing 
conflicts, but it also continuously generates conflict in order to secure 
a f)ermanent medium for the recursive application of the legal norms 
embedded in justice according to law.'® But by manufacturing con­
flict and by channeling social interaction into conflict only to resolve 
such conflict according to its own self-generated, self-referential, and 
self-enclosed normative scheme, legal autopoiesis confines legitimate 
legal discourse to a very narrow domain. That domain is circum­
scribed by the dichotomies between order and disorder, uncertainty 
and insurance, and ad hoc political accommodation and the relative 
equalization of autonomous law. The confinement of law to such a 
narrow domain may well seem artificial and contrived, and therefore 
fairly raises the question of whether contemporary legal practice 
could be more faithfully captured by leaving aside the seemingly un­
due restrictions imposed by autopoietic law. 
To be in a better position to answer this last question, it is neces­
sary to take a closer look at the second assumption that underlies the 
conception of distributive justice linked to autopoietic law; namely, 
that the system of (autopoietic) legal communication is inescapably 
subject to the constraints of normative closure. The task of assessing 
the validity of this assumption is complicated by the highly abstract 
nature of Luhmann's discussion. Nevertheless, as we shall see, useful 
parallels can be drawn between the functioning of legal autopoiesis 
and Luhmann's description of the phenomenon of monetarization 
which he presents as driving the process of economic autopoiesis. 
In a nutshell, the core function of legal communications, accord­
ing to Luhmann's autopoietic theory, is to provide information con­
cerning the meaning of events and, in particular, actions in relation to 
the binary code legal/illegal.'® This information is not simply the 
product of the enactment and application of legal rules, but rather 
emerges from the circular interplay between rules and decisions.®" 
Moreover, because the validation of legal norms hinges on a process 
'8 See Luhmann, supra note 42, at 12, 27. 
59 See LUHMANN, supra note 7, at 229-32. 
Id. at 231. In other words, rules are validated by the decisions that invent or elaborate 
them and (to complete the circle) decisions are validated by the rules that use them as the 
medium through which they acquire a more definite shape. 
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of unfolding circularity,®* neither the substantive values embodied in 
particular legal norms nor the intentions projected by actors engaged 
in the legal arena, can in any direct or significant way, inform deter­
minations dependent on use of the binary code legal/illegal. This is 
merely a further elaboration of the notion of normative closure. On 
the other hand, the internally sealed circular interplay between legal 
rules and decisions by no means forecloses expanding (or for that 
matter shrinking) the domain of that which can be rendered legally 
meaningful through submission to the binary code legal/illegal. This 
seems to follow from the very notion of cognitive openness. 
This highly abstract description of the work of an autopoietic 
legal system can be made perhaps easier to grasp by briefly concen­
trating on the analogy—drawn by Luhmann—^between autopoietic ec­
onomics and autopoietic law.®^ The autopoietic economic 
(sub)system, Luhmann maintains, 
operates openly with respect to needs, products, services, etc., and 
it is closed with respect to payments, using payments only to 
reproduce the possibility of further payments. Linking payments 
to the exchange of "real" goods interconnects closure and open­
ness, self-reference and environmental references. General purpose 
money provides for closure and remains the same in all hands. 
Specifiable needs open the system toward its environment. There­
fore, the operations of the system depend upon a continuous check­
ing of one in terms of the other. This hnkage is a prerequisite for 
the differentiation and self-regulation of the economic system.®^ 
In essence then, according to Luhmann's description, self-regulation 
of the economic system is based on the connection between needs 
(that fluctuate depending on factors located in the economic system's 
environment) and a closed monetarized exchange process that system­
atically mediates the complex interrelationship between the totahty of 
existing needs and the network of products and services susceptible of 
contribution to satisfying those needs. 
In the context of a free market economy, at least, the monetariza-
tion of all exchange relationships provides a self-regulating system 
that structures an order for meeting needs under conditions of moder­
ate scarcity. Monetarization, moreover, promotes and sustains a 
sharp differentiation between use value and exchange relationships be­
yond the subjective will of economic actors.®^ Accordingly, so long as 
See id. 
62 See id. at 230-31. 
63 Id. 
64 The differentiation between use and exchange value is a function of the systematization 
of the relationship between supply and demand through the communicative effects produced 
1992] A UTOPOIESIS AND JUSTICE 1705 
(and to the extent that) market exchanges are considered to furnish 
the best possible means to satisfy needs for goods and services, main­
tenance of the self-regulating economic system relying on the univer­
sal language of monetarization is essential. In other words, unless the 
autonomy of the economic system is maintained, the avowed purposes 
of economic interaction will undoubtedly be frustrated. Indeed, re­
placement of the autonomous mechanism of competition by a subjec­
tively crafted economic order would frustrate the economy's clearly 
differentiated function of maximizing the satisfaction of needs 
through the most efficient allocation of goods and services. 
Taking at face value both claims, the need for autonomy in the 
economic sphere and the same need in the legal sphere, may lead to 
the conclusion that there is a fundamental analogy between the ways 
in which these spheres respectively achieve differentiation. 
Monetarization seems to provide for the internal regulation of eco­
nomic relationships, and the binary code legal/illegal for the analo­
gous ordering of legal relationships. Upon closer analysis, however, 
the analogy is merely superficial. Indeed, the closure of an economic 
system that relies on monetarization is plausibly meaningful;^' while 
taken alone, the closure maintained by means of the application of the 
binary code legal/illegal remains essentially trivial. Economic closure 
through monetarization conceivably fulfills a substantive function 
that cannot be otherwise equivalently performed. Legal closure 
through application of the binary code legal/illegal, in contrast, ap­
pears to play a purely formal role and (at least standing alone) does no 
more than sustain an empty tautology (as opposed to a circular but 
meaning-enhancing or information-producing one). 
At least in the context of certain plausible conceptions of the role 
of the economy, the autonomous process of monetarization fulfills a 
function that is substantively (as opposed to merely definitionally) 
necessary and sufficient to propel the economic system towards 
achievement of its intended social task. Thus, for instance, economic 
by monetarization as an abstract and universally applicable code of quantification. Neither 
those who supply goods nor those who wish to acquire them can impose an exchange value on 
them because they depend on one another and on all others involved in the supply and demand 
of such goods for the determination of that value which is neither subjective nor objective, but 
intersubjective. For a more extended discussion of this last point, see Rosenfeld, supra note 30, 
at 832-39. Rational market exchanges cannot proceed without information concerning inter­
subjective exchange values which can only be systematically communicated in monetary terms. 
I say "plausibly" because I am not convinced that a conceptualization of the process of 
monetarization as autonomous and circular is preferable than other plausible conceptualiza­
tions that place greater emphasis on the connection between the economic sphere and other 
spheres of social interaction. This raises important issues which remain beyond the scope of 
this article. 
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efficiency may well be only achievable through the systematic coup­
ling of the closure of monetarization with openness to all needs, 
pr^ucts, services, etc. Take away the work performed by 
monetarization—namely, providing a common measure to otherwise 
incommensurable needs, products, services, and so on—and the possi­
bility of achieving economic efficiency through an independent eco­
nomic system disappears. 
From the standpoint of a complex modem legal system, on the 
other hand, the binary code legal/illegal may be necessary, but it is 
not sufficient to account for the normative characteristics of law, ex­
cept in a trivial tautological sense. Even conceding that ex post facto 
every legal communication may be interpreted as having designated 
the actions to which it refers as being either legal or illegal,®® legal 
practice can hardly nontrivially be reduced to the classification of ac­
tions as either legal or illegal.®' As pointed out above, autopoietic law 
promotes the values of order, insurance, and equalization relative to 
the ad hoc compromises of its political environment. These values are 
not, however, the only ones pursued by law as a distinct contempo­
rary practice. For example, the contemporary movement towards the 
juridification of human rights and constitutional guarantees extends 
beyond mere order or insurance. Actually, such juridification often 
appears to open the legal system to contested conceptions of justice 
beyond law that transcend mere communalism inasmuch as they are 
specifically oriented towards the domain of noncommunal interaction. 
Moreover, to the extent that constitutional jurisprudence wrestles 
with fundamental values associated with justice beyond law, it is more 
likely to undermine than to promote the kind of predictability neces­
sary to provide insurance.®® 
Hubert Rottleuthner has argued against this last proposition. As a counterexample, he 
refers to instances in which adultery, while itself, strictly speaking, neither legal nor illegal, 
may have important consequences for the determination of legal conflicts, such as in the case 
of divorce. See Hubert Rottleuthner, A Purified Sociology of Law: Niklas Luhmann On the 
Autonomy of the Legal System, 23 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 779, 792 (1989). 
It may always be countered that whereas it may be socially useful or meaningful, any­
thing beyond the autonomous and self-referential process of using the interplay of rules and 
decisions to communicate whether actions relating to conflicts are legal or illegal is not, strictly 
speaking, encompassed within the legal system. While such an argument may be defensible 
from a strictly logical or purely semantical point of view, nevertheless, due to its extreme 
reductionism, it projects a distorted image that does not capture the full richness of contempo­
rary law as a practice. 
As examples of significantly unpredictable areas of constitutional interpretation involv­
ing fundamental values relating to justice beyond law, one can mention substantive due process 
and equal protection rights under the United States Constitution. Concerning substantive due 
process see, for example, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973); and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). As for equal protection, there is 
perhaps no greater unpredictability than in the area of affirmative action. See ROSBNFELD, 
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The problems posed by the reductionism of the autopoietic con­
ception of legal practice are compounded by the fact that order, insur­
ance, and equalization are by no means the exclusive preserve of 
justice according to (autopoietic) law. Indeed, order and insurance 
can also be provided by the allopoietic law decreed by Hobbes's abso­
lute monarch, or even through political means. Similarly, greater 
equalization may be equally or better pursued in the political arena 
than through the modest standard of justice according to law that 
emerges from legal autopoiesis. 
In conclusion, the analogy between the economic process of 
monetarization and legal practice viewed as an autonomous and self-
regarding autopoietic system does not hold sufficiently to justify the 
claim of normative closure in the case of law. As a matter of fact, in 
certain fields such as constitutional law at least, it seems more accu­
rate to describe law as a practice as being normatively open to the 
extralegal norms that underlie justice beyond law. Moreover, to the 
extent that contemporary law as a practice is not restricted to the 
exclusive pursuit of order, insurance, and relative equalization, the 
autopoietic thesis seems defective as it unduly and arbitrarily narrows 
the domain of legitimate contemporary legal relationships. 
IV. AUTOPOIESIS AND THE CONTEMPORARY STRUGGLE 
FOR JUSTICE 
If autopoiesis fails to provide an accurate picture of contempo­
rary legal practice as a whole, it nevertheless captures the essence of 
one of the two principal tendencies of modem law. Notwithstanding 
initial appearances to the contrary, modem law does not simply con­
sist of the emancipation and triumph of justice according to law in the 
face of some final collapse of justice beyond law. Instead, the ascen­
dance of justice according to law is accompanied by a movement to­
wards the reconstitution of justice beyond law.®' More precisely. 
supra note 20, at ch. VII; Michel Rosenfeld, Metro-Broadcasting v. FCC: Affirmative Action at 
the Crossroads of Constitutional Liberty and Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 583 (1991). 
The tendency towards legal autonomy is manifested in, among other things, the prolifer­
ation of process based and procedural rules. Law's tendency towards extralegal norms, on the 
other hand, becomes apparent in legal doctrines that rely explicitly on extralegal values. In 
American constitutional law, the interplay between these two tendencies is exemplified in the 
contrast between procedural and susbstantive due process rights under the fourteenth amend­
ment's due process clause. The tendency towards extralegal values, however, is not limited to 
public law. Several legal scholars, for example, have sought to account for contemporary con­
tractual relationships in terms of extra-legal norms. See, e.g., PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE 
AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 
(1981); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SO­
CIAL CONTRACT (1980). 
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contemporary law appears to be the product of an ongoing clash be­
tween two contradictory drives: the drive towards autonomy and that 
towards the reestablishment of the vertical unity of justice.'" One of 
the dynamic functions of contemporary legal actions and communica­
tions is to continuously produce sufficient normative diflferentiation in 
order to avert the dissolution of the legal sphere through absorption 
into the theologico-ethical or political sphere. On the other hand, 
clashing against this relentless pursuit of differentiation is contempo­
rary law's insatiable need to work towards the recovery of the lost 
vertical unity of justice. Accordingly, the first of these two drives fu­
els contemporary law's tendency towards autopoiesis and autonomy 
while the second, on the contrary, pulls law away from autopoietic 
self-referentiality. 
Contemporary law cannot genuinely resolve the tension between 
its conflicting tendencies without losing either its identity or its legiti­
macy. Paradoxically, contemporary law is more likely to fulfill its 
role by seeking to maintain an equilibrium between its conflicting ten­
dencies than by striving to minimize contradiction through a dispro­
portionate development of one of these basic tendencies at the expense 
of the other. Moreover, the reason why the unrelenting pursuit of 
such an equilibrium is essential is because—contrjuy to Luhmann's 
assertion—the function of contemporary law is not merely one of dif­
ferentiation but also one of unification. Finally, the justification for 
contemporary law's simultaneous pursuit of both unification and dif­
ferentiation is extrinsic rather than intrinsic to law. As we shall see, 
contemporary law's tendency towards autopoiesis may be justified as 
part of a larger whole, but only in terms of extralegal norms. In other 
words, it is legitimate for law to turn inward, but only because that 
tends to promote the integration of law in the larger social matrix in 
accordance with extralegal norms poised to permeate social life as a 
whole. 
•'o The constitutional jurisprudence of due process provides a clear glimpse of this clash. 
Indeed, the interplay between procedural due process and substantive due process illustrates, 
through the implementation of procedural due process, how the search for legal autonomy 
collides with the recurring need to appeal to extra-legal norms through substantive due pro­
cess. The recognition of substantive rights has repeatedly prevented due process from becom­
ing exclusively procedural. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (due 
process implies a fundamental right of privacy); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) 
(due process implies certain fimdamental economic rights). However, the very determination 
of purely procedural due process rights may often be impossible without reference to substan­
tive rights grounded on fundamental extralegal values. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 
(1976) (determination of procedural due process rights depends on conceptions of liberty and 
property that are ultimately traceable to fundamental extralegal norms); Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
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The paradox presented by contemporary law's turn inward as 
part of its bid to recover the vertical unity of justice can be unraveled 
by reference to the social forces that shape contemporary legal rela­
tionships. The function of these relationships is not simply to produce 
difFerentiation or, on the contrary, to foment the unification of legal 
and extralegal norms. Instead, the function of contemporary law is to 
produce differentiation and promote unification simultaneously as 
prevailing circumstances make the possibiUty of reconciling legal 
norms with extralegal values conditional on carving out a distinct 
sphere of differentiation. 
The meaning of the movement towards legal autonomy is prone 
to being misinterpreted to the extent that law's turn inward is overde-
termined and that the full reason for it is likely to remain dissimu­
lated. Contemporary legal relationships are inscribed in a normative 
universe animated by the necessity to eliminate communal norms 
from the sphere of noncommunal relationships, and to replace them 
with noncommunal—or more precisely, transcommunal—norms. 
Accordingly, on the one hand, law must turn inward to escape from 
both the grasp of past parochialisms and from the temptations of fu­
ture parochialisms.^* But, on the other hand—and this is much more 
likely to escape notice—^the law must also turn inward as a means to 
the reconstitution of justice beyond law consistent with the establish­
ment of extralegal norms with transcommunal appeal. At the very 
least, the differentiation produced by law's inward turn should serve 
as a communicative vehicle designed to dispel the notion that the ex­
tralegal norms sought to be given transcommunal validity are but the 
old parochial norms bent on venturing beyond their legitimate territo­
rial boundaries. However, in the case of the pursuit of pluralism— 
which, as noted above, involves the estabhshment of substantive val­
ues rather than merely procedural ones'^—^the tendency towards legal 
autonomy plays a key role in, and is an integral part of, the systematic 
task of reconstituting the normative unity of the domain of noncom-
71 As an example of such an inward turn, one may cite the evolution of the English and 
American law of contract between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This evolution saw 
the replacement of substantive contract rules based on custom by process oriented rules relat­
ing both to contract formation and to the measure of damages. Moreover, the development 
and use of those process-oriented rules not only permitted abandoning locally rooted past cus­
toms but also made it possible to shield contractual relationships from future intermeddling in 
the name of extralegal norms. For a more extended discussion of this aspect of the evolution 
of contract law in the nineteenth century, see Rosenfeld, supra note 30, at 821-27. 
72 In other words, preservation of the tendency towards legal autonomy protects against 
relapses into communal factionalisms while reaching out for transcommunal, extralegal 
norms. 
72 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
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munal interaction. Indeed, without maintenance of the movement to­
wards legal autonomy, there would be no room for the peaceful 
coexistence of the different value systems that are compatible with 
pluralism. In view of pluralism's normative aim to accommodate as 
many different value systems as are compatible with it, the tendency 
towards legal autonomy associated with it should be interpreted as 
part and parcel of the pluralist effort to reconstitute justice beyond 
law so as to legitimately empower it over noncommunal relationships. 
Any attempt to reconstitute justice beyond law from the stand­
point of pluralism, however, seems ultimately bound to fail. Viewing 
communal extralegal norms as first order norms, plurahsm generates 
a second order of norms. These second order or transcommunal 
norms are supposed to provide a unified normative framework for the 
reconstitution of justice beyond law. Within this framework, first or­
der norms are not suppressed but merely subordinated to second or­
der norms. For some first order norms, subordination means 
displacement. For example, pluralism is compatible with the embrace 
of certain particular religious norms, provided that the latter are rele­
gated to the private sphere.^'^ Furthermore, for other first order 
norms, subordination to second order pluralist norms means, in effect, 
ehmination. Thus, for instance, crusading religions and rigidly an-
tipluralistic moral and political norms can be given no room in a nor­
mative universe sought to be unified under pluralist values.^' Now, 
since pluralism cannot do without any first order norms (indeed, plu­
ralism is meaningless without at least some available choice among 
different first order norms) and because it cannot accommodate all 
first order norms, any pluralist attempt at reconstituting justice be­
yond law is in some sense arbitrary inasmuch as it incorporates some 
first order norms while excluding others. In other words, pluralism 
cannot avoid making choices among competing first order norms in 
the course of its attempted reconstitution of justice beyond law. From 
the standpoint of the first order norms left out, however, pluralism's 
attempted reconstitution of justice beyond law cannot overcome the 
breakdown in the vertical unity of justice as it necessarily privileges 
some of the contending first order norms over others. 
cf. KARL MARX, On the Jewish Question, in WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG MARX ON 
PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY 216-248 (Loyd D. Easton & Kurt H. Guddat trans. & eds., 1967) 
(arguing that religious emancipation can only be obtained at the cost of relegating religion to 
the private sphere). 
73 Arguably, crusading religions and antipluralistic ethical and political creeds could be 
partly accommodated in the normative universe of the pluralist. To the extent that antiplural-
ist values are an essential and inseparable component of a given value system, however, partial 
accommodation could well be tantamount to outright rejection. 
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We are now in a position to see more clearly the place of legal 
autonomy in pluralism's attempted reconstitution of justice beyond 
law in the face of the predominance of dealings among strangers. 
Legal autonomy plays both a negative and a positive role in such at­
tempted reconstitution. The negative role consists in uprooting, and 
cutting loose from, first order extralegal norms in order to overcome 
the obstacles interposed by communal parochialisms. If legal auton­
omy were exclusively used for purposes of performing this negative 
role, however, it would promote nihihsm instead of furthering plural­
ism. To serve the aims of plurahsm, therefore, legal autonomy must 
also contribute to the positive function of reintegrating uprooted first 
order norms under the legitimating aegis of hierarchically superior 
second order norms. But, since these second order norms are ulti­
mately extralegal in nature (in other words, pluralism is not an inher­
ently legal norm), legal autonomy's positive contribution must be 
indirect in nature. Specifically, legal autonomy's indirect positive 
contribution to pluralism consists of furnishing the space necessary 
for the reintroduction of first order norms as subordinated to second 
order norms. Finally, through the ceaseless concurrent pursuit of its 
positive and negative roles, the legal system oriented towards self-ref­
erence and autonomy tends to postpone pluralism's ultimate inevita­
ble failure to recover the vertical unity of justice. Moreover, focus on 
the autonomous tendencies of the legal system contributes to the post­
ponement in question by concealing, on the one hand, the nexus be­
tween pluralism and justice beyond law and, on the other, the 
fundamental asymmetry between the legal system's role in uprooting 
first order norms and its role in reintroducing such norms as 
subordinate to second order norms. Indeed, for purposes of the legal 
system's uprooting function, all first order norms are equivalent; yet 
for purposes of their reintroduction as subordinate to second order 
norms, such first order norms are by no means all equal, as only some 
of them will in the end prove to be suitable. 
CONCLUSION 
Luhmann's legal autopoiesis represents an advance over positiv­
ism, but it ultimately fails to erect an impregnable barrier between 
justice according to law and justice beyond law. Self-referential auto-
poietic law guarantees minimal distributive justice, relative equaliza­
tion, and the benefits of greater order and insurance. Contemporary 
legal systems, however, are not confined to the pursuit of order and 
insurance through the stabilization of expectations. Contrary to the 
thrust of Luhmann's fundamental assumptions, contemporary legal 
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systems must remain normatively open to the ever greater juridi-
fication of human and constitutional rights squarely grounded on ex­
tralegal norms. As we have seen, contemporary legal systems tend 
towards autonomy, but that represents only part of the story. Indeed, 
contemporary law's tendency towards autonomy and justice accord­
ing to law is accompanied by (the often concealed but nevertheless 
ever present) contrary tendency towards extralegal norms and justice 
beyond law. The dynamic interlocking of these contrary tendencies is 
the product of the pluralist quest to reconstitute the vertical unity of 
justice without bringing about the communal re-rooting of first order 
norms. Perhaps, by abandoning the pursuit of pluralism and the legal 
and extralegal values which it entails, it would become possible to 
move towards a more complete legal autonomy. Be that as it may, 
however, pluralism should not be lightly discarded for it may well 
represent—^in spite of its many contradictions and failures—^the best 
available hope for justice based on the acceptance of plausible trans-
communal norms. 
